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PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST
Michael J. Glennon*
"There simply does not exist a method of moral philosophy,"] John Hart Ely tells us in a three-page rejoinder to all moral
philosophers, past, present, and future. Push back each philosopher's analysis far enough, he argues, and each is seen to have
made an initial value choice no better or worse than the others.
"When we search for an external source of values with which to
fill in the Constitution's open texture," he writes, "we search in
vain."2
There is, of course, some truth to the point: syllogisms can't
always come from other syllogisms because ultimate major premises don't come from epistomological storks. But it's an objection
from which Ely himself doesn't escape. .Democracy and .Distrust
relies in the end upon the manifest good of representation reinforcement. Clearing the channels of political change and correcting systemic malfunctions may ultimately be terrific things for
courts to do, but we shouldn't deceive ourselves into believing that
process is never a value choice. It can be, and for Ely it is. To
paraphrase his response to Alexander Bickel, that's what he promised he wouldn't do to us; "the fact that it's done with mirrors
shouldn't count as a defense. "3
All of which leads to the point of this essay: he shouldn't have
promised us that, because it just might not be true that we search
in vain. Neither Rawls nor Nozick has the answer, Ely suggests,
because they "reach very different conclusions" and, in the case of
Rawls, "almost all the commentators on [his] work have expressed
reservations about his conclusions."4
Well, there could be a little more going on here. Maybe one
of them is right and the critics are just plain wrong. Ely's line
from Philip Roth, applied by him to naturallaw-"Then the other
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fellow is wrong, idiot!"s-applies here as well: funny or not, it
may nonetheless be true that the other fellow is wrong; and the
mere fact that the other fellow disagrees does not, in any event,
mean that you're wrong. It's just too facile to dismiss the work of
Rawls or Nozick or whomever because his writing has not been
universally hailed as a harbinger of the millenium. Democracy
may be a great idea, but you can't decide whether a particular
moral philosophy is "fine"6 (to use Ely's word) through the use of
public opinion.
It's especially necessary to get down into the trenches and respond substantively where the rejected moral philosophy is one
that claims ineluctability-one that purports to follow inescapably
from universally accepted intuitive premises. Perhaps the paradigm of such approaches is Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative: Act according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same
time as a universal law of human conduct. 7 One must, in other
words, apply the same rule to another's act that one applies to
one's own act. A person unwilling to do so effectively acknowledges that his own behavior is impermissible by refusing to posit
the moral principle necessary to legitimize his own conduct. Lying is thus impermissible in that one would not wish all others to
lie.s The actions of collective entities are arguably subject to the
same precept: the impermissibility of shooting down an unarmed
civilian aircraft that has strayed over one's territory is demonstrated by a nation's presumed unwillingness to allow its own civilian aircraft to be shot down.
This notion of "neutral principles" is of course not foreign to
constitutional jurisprudence.9 Indeed, variants of the idea permeate theories of collective order. The principle that like cases
should be decided alike is at the heart of the mandate of equal
protection of the laws. The whole doctrine of stare decisis may in
the end represent little more than the same consideration.
The theory of the categorical imperative has, it is true, generated volumes of criticism. One obvious difficulty lies in characterizing the "act" in question. Is the act a "lie" or a statement made,
say, under duress to save a settlement from attack? Any act can
5. P. RoTH, THE GREAT AMERICAN NovEL 19 (!913),quotedin J. ELY, supra note I,
48.
6. J. ELY supra note I, at 58.
7. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 63 (L. BECK trans. 1949).
8. See id. at 346-50.
9. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. I (1959); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORD POLITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG
THE SUPERPOWERS (1971).
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be generalized or particularized almost infinitely so as to include
or exclude almost any attendant circumstances, and the breadth of
the "maxim" that derives from universalizing the act will vary accordingly. Neither Kant nor anyone else has told us how to decide what facts go into a proper formulation of any given act.
Although the objection is sound, it applies to far more than
simply Kant's categorical imperative. The concept of a "holding"
no broader than the "facts" of a case, for example, raises precisely
the same problem, as any lawyer who has ever written a brief can
testify. The objection may ultimately go to limitations inherent in
human conceptualization: moral precepts-rules intended to
guide human conduct-are, after all, constructs of the mind, not
scientific discoveries. Many of the objections leveled against intuitionist theories such as Kant's are, in reality, objections to
processes of inference and syllogistic reasoning that comprise not
only the methodology of law, but the life of the mind.
Less persuasive is the objection that the categorical imperative is without substance. Ely may be too quick in concluding that
the neutral principles notion "does not . . . tell us anything useful
about the appropriate content of those principles."w Arguably,
the seminal moral act is the very act of formulating maxims of
conduct under the guidance of the imperative ("lying is impermissible," "murder is impermissible," etc.). Applying the categorical
imperative to the very act of formulating maxims may preclude
the adoption of any maxim which would vitiate the process by
which others formulate their own maxims.
Viewed thus, the imperative is anything but content-neutral.
Kant's belief that each person must be treated as an end rather
than a means 11 -that human autonomy is implied by the categorical imperative-then becomes more understandable. A Charles
Manson who professes to prefer a world of mass killers is therefore not adhering to the imperative, because the act of killing
eliminates the victim's ability to undertake the act of choice that
the imperative demands as a part of formulating a maxim. The
consequences of the maxim "killing is permissible" are, in other
words, incompatible with the antecedent condition of volition
upon which the possibility of adopting that maxim (or any
maxim) depends.
The methodology suggested by John Rawls provides a conceptual paraphrase of Kant.I2 To shape a just society, detach
10. J. ELY, supra note I, at 55.
II. See I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 12-13 (W. Hastie trans. 1974).
12. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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yourself mentally from your position in your own and assume the
"original position" in which no one yet has any position-economic, social, political, or even physical or psychological. Behind
a "veil of ignorance''-not knowing in which position you might
ultimately find yourself~esign all societal positions, as well as
the governing law. The process of so designing a society is akin to
the process of formulating maxims of conduct under the categorical imperative. In the "original position," assuming equal odds of
ending up in any of the positions you design, you might not make
all positions equally attractive so as to build in systems of incentive. Nonetheless you would infuse each with the highest possible
measure of autonomy. Why? Because you don't know what characteristics and preferences you'll end up with, and you would
want to make it as easy as possible to be "fulfilled" in whatever
position you ultimately occupy.
To the person who claims to prefer a society that minimizes
autonomy, the response is that he or she cannot assume that that
same preference would exist in the new, randomly assigned position. The only means of assuring fulfillment on the part of an
authoritarian personality is, paradoxically, to provide that person
sufficient autonomy to vitiate unwanted autonomy. Persons filling
societal positions created behind a "veil of ignorance" would thus
be granted the same wide latitude of personal choice required by
the categorical imperative--choice with regard to all matters not
impinging upon the right of others to choose.
The conclusion curiously parallels the utilitarian argument of
John Stuart Mill that the only proper role of the state is to prevent
one person from harming another.D Indeed, under Rawls's theory it would also seem unreasonable to agree in the "original position" to rules restricting harmless conduct, because you might end
up in the position of wanting to engage in that conduct. Conversely, you would readily agree to rules governing every new position which would prohibit persons assigned to those positions
from harming others.
The result is a state in which people are let alone to pursue
their own ends except when those ends involve harm to others.
This reasoning may support Justice Brandeis's claim that the
"right to be let alone" is the right "most valued by civilized
men."I4 This right to be let alone is at the core of all theories of
personal autonomy.
For reasons such as these, a right of personal autonomy of the
13.
14.

See]. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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sort recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut Is might properly be regarded as fundamental-perhaps, indeed, the most fundamental
of rights. The Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices impinged profoundly on the right to be let alone
by ruling out the choice to use birth control devices while expanding choice on the part of no one. The New York statute invalidated by the Court in Lochner v. New York 16 was, one might
argue, valid for precisely the same reason: it enhanced the ability
of New York bakery employees to be let alone by freeing them
from economic coercion. Prior to the enactment of the statute
their personal autonomy was undermined by a vast economic disparity in bargaining positions which reduced unacceptably the
breadth of life-choices of which autonomy is comprised. (It is, I
think, a frivolous objection to claim that the "personal autonomy"
of the bakery owners was violated by denying them the opportunity to force workers to work more than 60 hours per week;
among other things, the breadth of their life-choices would have
remained essentially undiminished.) When On Liberty was written, the greatest threat to personal autonomy was posed by big
government; big business as we know it today did not yet exist.
After the industrial revolution, however, in an era of mega-businesses whose annual revenues rival most of the countries on the
globe, governmental interposition is not only appropriate but necessary to redress the imbalance of power and to protect personal
autonomy.
This is the wisdom, albeit unarticulated, of Nebbia v. New
York.I 7 Preservation of the right to be let alone-a right that subsists in choice-examination-is, in the end, the state's objective in
much "social welfare" legislation, and it is entirely proper that the
Supreme Court be solicitous of that objective by deferring, as it
has, to the legislative will through use of the "rational basis" test.
For the reasons stated, however, the Court arguably ought not defer to the legislative judgment embodied in a statute of the sort
hypothesized by Harry Wellington-"a statute making it a crime
for any person to remove another person's gall bladder, except to
save that person's life." Is It is not enough to say, as Ely does, that
such a law simply couldn't be enacted. In Millian terms, the functional equivalent was enacted by the people of Connecticut, and a
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
18. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 304-05 (1973), quoted in J. ELY, supra note I, at
182.
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number of other states as well-~me need simply scan the list of
"right to privacy" cases to see that Ely's improbabilities have captured the fancy of state legislator after state legislator, not to mention city councils and school boards. Ely's theory of participation
reinforcement is thus not simply under-protective of personal autonomy; it ignores personal autonomy completely as a constitutionally legitimate value because it is not process-related.
This is a serious, and I think fatal, shortcoming in his theory.
The intuitionist case for personal autonomy, summarily outlined
above, is not without flaws, the most prominent being a measure
of circularity. But it is not so patently specious as to be dismissable on the theory that the Constitution can't "keep up with
the New York Review of Books,"I9 much less because "almost all
the commentators on" someone's work have "expressed reservations about his conclusions."2o Personal autonomy is one legalpolitical value-perhaps the only one-that arguably traces directly to intuitive sources. It is also the value most threatened by a
high-technology, corporation-dominated society. Strict scrutiny
of statutes impinging on the right to be let alone is needed if that
right is to survive.

19. J. ELY, supra note I, at 58.
20. ld. (referring to Rawls).

